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Abstract
Anyone trying to be a citizen has to pass through a set of 
practices trying to be a state. This paper investigates some of 
the ways testing practices calibrate citizens, and in doing so, 
perform “the state.” The paper focuses on three forms of citi-
zenship testing, which it considers exemplary forms of “state 
work,” and which all, in various ways, concern “migration.” 
First, the constitution of a “border crossing,” which requires 
an identity test configured by deceptibility. Second, the Dutch 
asylum process, in which “being gay” can, in certain cases, 
be reason for being granted asylum, but where “being gay” is 
also the outcome of an examination organized by suspicion. 
And third, the Dutch measurement of immigrants’ “integra-
tion,” which is comprised of a testing process in which such 
factishes as “being a member of society” and “being modern” 
surface. Citizenship is analyzed in this paper as accrued and 
(re)configured along a migration trajectory that takes shape 
as a testing concours, meaning that subjects become citizens 
along a trajectory of testing practices. In contributing both to 
work on states and citizenship, and to work on testing, this 
paper thus puts forward the concept of citizenship testing 
as state work, where “state work is the term for that kind 
of labor that most knows itself as comparison, equivalency, 
and exchange in the social realm” (Harney, 2002, pp. 10–11). 
Throughout the testing practices discussed here, compari-
son, equivalency, and exchange figure prominently as the 
practical achievements of crafting states and citizens.
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1  | INTRODUC TION: STATE WORK AND/A S TESTING PR AC TICES
Anyone trying to be a citizen has to pass through a set of practices trying to be a state. Those who become visible 
as “migrants,” in particular, are subject to a variety of practices aimed at ascertaining their identity, provenance, 
and formal citizenship status. Such practices often have the character of tests, and this paper discusses three 
kinds of tests as a way of analyzing the co-constitutive effects of “states” and “migrants.” These tests can be 
tests of identity, as when people's passports are checked at the border. They can be tests of veracity, as when the 
accounts by asylum seekers are scrutinized by state officials. And they can also be tests of belonging, as when 
social scientific measurement apparatuses are deployed to measure “immigrant integration.” In this paper, I discuss 
these three cases as ways to shed light on the coproduction of the state and citizenship. I conceive of citizenship as 
a testing concours. That means citizenship is here considered not as an individuated bundle of rights and duties (cf. 
Marshall, 1963), nor in terms of “acts of citizenship” by subjects themselves (Isin & Nielsen, 2008), nor exclusively 
as “migrant citizenships” (Nyers, 2015). These are valuable ways of speaking of citizenship, but here I adopt the 
complementary approach of considering specific trajectories of citizenship as inextricably bound up with state 
technologies for the visualization of migration.
An increasing literature argues that migration is not an object readily available for observation, but exists by ren-
dering the movement of certain people visible as “migration.” Migration, in other words, does not consist of people 
travelling from one country to another, but of the registration of the movement of some, but not of others. On the 
one hand, this perspective builds on work in the “autonomy of migration” literature (Bojadžijev & Karakayali, 2010; 
Mezzadra, 2010; Moulier-Boutang, 1998; Papadopoulos & Tsianos, 2013; Rodriguez, 1996), which considers migra-
tion as a phenomenon characterized by moments of relative autonomy from either socio-economic circumstances 
or state control. On the other hand, it builds on work that emphasizes the visualization of migration. Not only does 
migration become a spectacle in and through border control (De Genova, 2013), the very “thing” called migration 
does not become available for public consideration prior to forms of visualization that are constitutive of it. In 
other words, migration does not precede visualization (Dijstelbloem & Broeders, 2014; Dijstelbloem, van Reekum, 
& Schinkel, 2017; Scheel, 2013; van Reekum & Schinkel, 2017). What is called “autonomy of migration” might be 
more suitably termed “autonomy of mobility.” Mobility only becomes “migration” once state officials record data, 
check passports, grant visa, refuse entry, statistically assess movement, and out of the meshwork of these practices 
comes the object called “migration,” which remains unstable because it can never be fully traced back to data.
At the same time, visualization, registration, and surveillance should not be seen as emanating from sovereign 
state bodies with the capacities to visualize. Rather, what this paper discusses as citizenship testing allows an under-
standing of sovereignty by way of mobility (cf. Papadopoulos, 2018). As Annalisa Pelizza has said, “migrant registra-
tion and identification” can be seen as the “co-construction of individuals and polities” (Pelizza, 2019, p. 1). Seen in 
this light, migration control and the calibration of people's citizenship enable what Timothy Mitchell has called “state 
effects” to exist and persist (Mitchell, 1991, 1999). In visualizing migration, there is something to be decided, but that 
is just another way of saying that the specter of sovereignty requires the possibility of performing ritualized opera-
tions on the movement of people that cannot be contained, and never were. The visualization and public enactment 
of what we call “migration,” over against the mere movement of bodies across the earth, thus presents “the state” 
with ways to prop up itself, to give credibility to the existence of state effects. Sovereignty cannot exist without 
its ritualized confirmations (Hansen & Stepputat, 2005). To say that migration and the state are co-constitutive of 
each other is reductive of the generally asymmetrical ways in which particular practices and associations (the ones 
we tend to call “state”) attach to other practices and associations (the ones we end up calling “migration”) in order 
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to enact “migration” as, itself, a particular effect of the state. As Mitchell has said, what is called “state” comes out 
of “methods of organization, arrangement and representation that operate with the social practices they govern, 
yet create the effect of an enduring structure apparently external to those practices” (Mitchell, 1999, pp. 77–78).
This paper looks at such effects by considering different moments and spaces of “migration” in terms of par-
ticular kinds of testing practices. These testing practices constitute the work, which can be properly called “state 
work” (Harney, 2002), that renders “migration” and “citizenship” not only visible but also more broadly available for 
practical engagement and for public assessment and concern. State work is to be seen not as the work enacted by 
the state, but the ongoing process of state formation through particular kinds of labor (i.e., the production of state 
effects) in which the visualization, calibration, and administration of “migration” and “citizenship” serves as one of 
several occasions to produce state effects. In the midst of a presumed ongoing “migration crisis” in Europe, this 
is all the more relevant because, as Nicholas de Genova has said, there is a “plurality of contenders for sovereign 
power” (De Genova, 2017, p. 5). Likewise, such a perspective contributes to a growing awareness of “de-naturaliz-
ing the national” in migration studies (Amelina & Faist, 2012).
Rogier van Reekum has productively differentiated between the performative effects that pertain to the vi-
sualization and calibration of “migration” and what he calls the demonstrative effects that always accompany 
such performativity but exceed it by drawing attention to the specificity of the association that produces it (van 
Reekum, 2018). By enacting the public life of “migration,” “the state” demonstrates the contingency and limita-
tions of its own entanglement in the world of territories, materials, signs, and moving bodies. As van Reekum says:
migration is, through its varied and contradictory visualizations, also a test in which the capacities and 
tendencies of an association—“Europe”, for instance—are demonstrated. (van Reekum 2018, p. 4)
In close proximity to this conception of migration, this paper considers “citizenship” as consisting of a variety of tests. 
Its main aim is to highlight the different ways in which “the state” is enacted through a state work that takes the form 
of tests performed on “migrants.” In the same process, the citizenship of the subjects of these tests is enacted in line 
with an increasing emphasis in Western countries on “earned citizenship” (Van Houdt, Suvarierol, & Schinkel, 2011).
The next section discusses the concept of “citizenship concours.” The following sections discuss three differ-
ent cases—border crossings, asylum decisions, and immigrant integration monitoring—as sites along a citizenship 
testing concours. The first of these cases is largely conceptual and theoretical in nature. The second is based on 
ethnographic data collected by Hertoghs (2019), and analyzed by her and myself (Hertoghs & Schinkel, 2018), and 
the third is based on a discourse analyses I conducted (cf. Schinkel, 2017).
2  | CITIZENSHIP A S TESTING CONCOURS
Testing has become central to the configuration of citizenship in Western countries. The spread of police work, 
as well as of securitization and surveillance, and the multiplication of borders all entail rhythmic setups in which 
statuses are confirmed or denied, bodies are included or not, and borders are crossed or not. To speak of a “test-
ing concours” in the context of migration and citizenship is meant to evoke the etymological sense of “concours” 
as “moving, running, or flowing together,” and as concerning both a gathering or accumulation and the tracing of 
a trajectory. Deriving from concurrere (to run together), it at the same time signifies competition and flight. In the 
context of testing, it recalls notions such as a concours d’élégance, a “parade of vehicles in which the entrants are 
judged according to the elegance of their appearance” (OED, 1923). Something quite close to this happens when 
physical appearance is compared across face and document at the border (my first case study in this paper). And 
it occurs when asylum applicants in the Netherlands are tested in terms of their sexual identity (second case). 
Immigrant integration surveys (third case) likewise have an element of “beauty contest,” of being interpellated to 
present the self in a morally ideal form that mirrors as closely as possible a benchmarked national norm.
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To consider citizenship as a trajectory of tests also means to see it in terms of indetermination, as practices 
for the calibration of potentiality that, as outcome, steer people in certain directions, enabling or preventing 
their circulation and their options. Citizenship as test so to speak resides in the impasse between test entry and 
test result, if only because the outcome of a test tends to give rise to another test. State work here consists of 
practices and sites of indetermination, of not-yet, and this waiting mode is indeed typical of common experiences 
of, and “at” the border. This is true for those who wait to have their passports checked at sites that stand in for 
“territorial borders” (which most of the time are not “at” the territorial border). But it is also true for those who, in 
a literal sense, have long since arrived but whose mode of living is nonetheless observed, by means of immigrant 
integration monitoring, as arrested, as not yet up to speed with modernity, not yet fully “arrived” (Boersma, 2019; 
Boersma & Schinkel, 2018). This monitoring amounts to a test of the degree to which they have actually “arrived,” 
the term for which tends to be immigrants’ “integration,” which since 1994 is interchangeable in policy language 
with “citizenship” in the Netherlands (Schinkel & van Houdt, 2010).
The time of the test, then, condemns one to impasse, to a life on hold. However briefly in some cases (as in the 
passport check), in others this can be an extended modality of living (as in immigrants monitored in their “catching 
up” with modernity). Those who reside “in the hold” of such tests experience state work. Their lives are impending, 
pending the results of tests. But as is so often the case with experiments, tests, or pilots, one outcome of a test is 
that more tests are needed. Even if one passes a test (one is granted asylum), one is enrolled in yet another series 
of tests (citizenship or language tests, immigrant integration tests), and so those who emerge from the object of 
“migration” are not readily cut loose from it, but are rather enrolled in a testing concours that renders their citi-
zenship available for public scrutiny.
A life in the hold of citizenship tests does not mean the total blocking of mobility. Rather, as Tazzioli has shown, 
it decelerates, obstructs and troubles the trajectories of migrants (Tazzioli, 2017). Precisely through this kind of 
“migration control,” the state itself emerges as an actor with an address. Because I am interested in the ways testing 
configures the tester (in this case: “the state”), I will not pay attention here to something that, at first sight, would 
have been obvious to include: citizenship tests designed by governments to explicitly “test” the degree to which im-
migrants are “assimilated” to “host societies.” In recent years, much research has appeared on these tests (Bauböck 
& Joppke, 2010; Etzioni, 2007; Michalowski, 2011; Monforte, Bassel, & Khan, 2019; van Houdt, 2014; van Oers, 
2013). In the Netherlands, from which I will draw two of my three cases here, such tests have been subject to critique 
because of their unrealistic character: hardly any “native Dutch” would pass such a test (who knows what to call the 
sticks that separate your groceries from the next person at the supermarket?). In the Netherlands, citizenship tests 
are also conducted prior to immigration, at consulates in “sending countries.” As naturalization tests, they can be 
quite consequential. Furthermore, as recently shown in the UK, they have real effects in terms of sorting inclusion 
and exclusion (Monforte et al., 2019). I will not discuss them extensively here for two reasons. The first is that they 
are part of, or tend to function as, a spectacle, and their attention in both critical and affirmative social scientific 
work always threatens to contribute to their spectacular mode of operating. The second reason not to include them 
here is more pertinent as it concerns the work that I would like the concept of a test to do here. This paper proposes 
thinking about citizenship and migration as trajectories interlaced with, and in part coordinated by, various testing 
practices that are not necessarily explicitly, deliberately, and consciously planned as tests. In particular in the context 
of this special issue, this is a way of drawing attention to something that tends to be little emphasized: it points at 
social practices that operate as tests without being explicitly conceived as such. There are practices and situations 
that function as tests without being imagined as tests. And there are demonstrative effects without demonstrations 
as the explicit aim. This paper therefore also seeks to push our understanding of social practices as tests, and to do 
so it is most fruitful to apply the concept of test to cases where that word is not necessarily used.
The following sections contain the three case studies to develop this conception of citizenship as testing 
concours: (1) identification and border crossing; (2) the establishment of applicants’ sexual identity in the Dutch 
asylum procedure; (3) the monitoring of immigrant integration. These cases constitute three stops, and three con-
figurations of the hold, in an ongoing concours of citizenship.
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3  | FIRST STOP: CROSSING A BORDER AND THE TESTS OF 
IDENTIFIC ATION
In the prevailing vernacular of borders, the figure of the cross is omnipresent. Borders are crossed, and to be able 
to cross a border is a key feature of citizenship. Movement proceeds orthogonally to territorial lines. Yet an elabo-
rate infrastructure is in place to provide this vernacular with its everyday assumed naturalcy. Infrastructure, by 
definition, is distributed, and so what gets to be abstractly considered as a line is rendered possible by a concrete 
but dispersed set of tools and practices. First of all, the line needs stand-ins in the form of gates, fences, walls, 
and signs. This spatial semiology cannot be collapsed into a single “line” but it can enact what is understood as 
the “line” of the border. It also indicates zones where this enactment takes place, and these zones are zones of 
the hold: people are held up, both in the sense of being slowed down and having to wait “at the border,” and in 
the sense of potentially being held in rooms or cells, for interrogation or internment. So while on the one hand, 
the spatial semiology of the border is a gesturing that signals the waning of state power “at the border” (Brown, 
2010), on the other hand it enacts zones where that power is displayed in one of its most raw forms. The zone 
of the hold, however, is a membrane. It exists to permeate, to sift and sort, and therefore it is a zone of testing. 
Testing results in speeding up again, in the continuation of circulation, or in an extension of the hold. The zone 
of the hold is structured in a binary way of “go” and “no go.” It is important to note that this account conforms to 
the semiological gesturing that enacts the border-as-line. There are many other ways in which, ex post facto, the 
border is said to have been crossed, for instance when migrants turn up that have crossed the border “irregularly.” 
The point here is precisely that the “regular” way of crossing a border requires a testing setup consisting of state 
work enacting both the border as a line, and the state as a sovereign body.
That binary setup is structured by a seemingly simple test: the match between document and person. Usually 
the document is a passport, and often it needs to additionally contain a visa or equivalent, which may or may not 
be a digital registration. The test thus consists of detecting a match between person and document/registration. 
The determination of a match, or a lack of one, is what is usually called “identification.” Identification is a specific 
kind of testing procedure in that it involves the correlation between two separate visual tests (van Reekum & 
Schinkel, 2017). Each of these tests involves the attribution of identities to a body that, if identification succeeds, 
shows up twice and with a sufficiently high degree of resemblance. Identification thus involves two separate se-
ries that are correlated so that the same body yields similar results in the two series. For instance, facial attributes 
of a body are matched to the attributes of a picture in a passport, names pronounced are correlated with names 
registered, height observed is correlated with officially reported height, and reported place of birth is checked 
with registered place of birth. The simplest way of stating this, is that a border guard checks certain attributes of 
a person's passport with certain attributes of the person in front of them. But this is far from a trivial matter and 
in fact concerns the double construction of, on the one hand, a body assembled from attributes inferred from the 
passport, and, on the other, a body made up of observed attributes from the person “at” the border.
This conception of identification has two consequences. First, it means that identification is not a process of 
memory, an assessment of what is already familiar. Rather, it works towards the singular by means of the individ-
uation or instantiation of identities (of race, ethnicity, gender, nationality, etc.) that are translocal—in fact, their 
translocal character is the very reason the test of “crossing the border” can be performed at all. And, second, it 
means identification is based on the comparison of one body with a multitude of other bodies, since this is the 
only way to individuate attributes to a body. Identification, in other words, entails the attribution of the singular by 
means of comparison from within the plural. It locates the individual within a multitude of comparable individuals 
that each participate differently in a set of shared attributes. Why does identification involve the correlation of 
two separate visual tests? The main reason is that it is governed by what Valentin Groebner (2007) has called de-
ceptibility. Deceptibility exists in personal identification because identification works by attaching certain markers 
to bodies that are, of necessity, detachable. I cannot use my body as proof that I am who I say I am, not even in 
the case of biometrics. Biometrics is merely a way to—potentially—simplify the tests that border work performs. 
     |  561SCHINKEL
Biometric data from my body need to be matched with their counterpart in the passport. The body cannot stand 
in for the image of itself. Historically, of course, the possible exception to this is the tradition of the “real” or “au-
thentic image” of Christ (vera icon), as in the shroud of Turin, where the image is an index or imprint of the original 
and as such participates in it. But that tradition, too, is riddled with the paradox of establishing or contesting the 
authenticity of the authentic image (cf. Belting, 2005, p. 45). The vera icon problematic is repeated in the his-
tory of photography, in which William Henry Fox Talbot, for instance, considered “nature's hand” to be present 
(Bredekamp, 2010, p. 186). But while 19th-century theories of photography often placed themselves in the vera 
icon lineage, later theories contested photography's immediacy (cf. Bate, 2016, pp. 12–13), and with the separation 
of the photograph from its object, deceptibility re-entered consideration.
And so identification of necessity involves the matching between two separate series, between bodies and 
documents. A border guard does not recognize a person; she or he identifies the person by comparing body and 
document, and by comparing the body with a multitude of other bodies. Faces look like other faces, which is why 
they can be identified. But because the passport that goes with the face might be faked, stolen, or otherwise a 
case of deception, deceptibility governs the border test. For any singular identification, this might be a risk, and 
border guards are well aware of it. But for identification as such, it is a necessary condition. In order to check 
whether I am who I say I am, I have been given a document that is separable from my body, and this separability of 
necessity entails deceptibility, the possibility of my passing without the proper passport.
That deceptibility governs the border crossing as test therefore does not mean the test works towards the 
elimination of deception. On the contrary, it means that deceptibility remains and is the very condition of the 
test. Deceptive mimicry, deceit, camouflage, must of necessity be possible precisely because of the comparative 
character of identification. Persons are compared to other persons making up classes defined by nationality, birth, 
skin color, and so on. But passports, too, are compared to other passports to test their authenticity. Finally, pass-
ports and persons are compared, tested for sufficiency of resemblance in the face of a deceptibility that cannot be 
dispelled. If bodies, faces, and passports wouldn't look like other bodies, faces, and passports, there would be no 
possibility of identification. The production of the singular “identity,” and along with it the production of a “go/no 
go,” is a result of the comparison from within a plurality of bodies, faces, passports. The problem of identification 
is the problem of linking up bodies and documents, and the necessary separation of the body from the document 
means that, in each case, that linking up, and thus the individuation of identity, is what is worked towards, not 
what can be worked with. And the point of identification is to follow through on the consequences of deceptibility, 
namely the fact that a body can be in but not of the place it is at.
The go/no go that is the result of this testing procedure is based on the determination where a body belongs, 
and how it can, accordingly, circulate. But the test here is possible on the basis of a deceptibility it cannot cancel, 
and that it is not intended to cancel. Testing is possible on the basis of ambiguity, and its aim is a procedurally 
justified decision. Testing is thoroughly comparative here: it compares both across bodies and between bodies and 
documents. In order to stabilize such testing setups, state work has required the historical control of the means 
of deception. This involves commensuration and the establishment of what I have elsewhere called “comparity,” 
a space of equivalence that enables comparison (Schinkel, 2016). The infrastructure of bodies, buildings, docu-
ments, and technologies that the “border” gathers requires comparity spaces, and the historical stabilization of 
such comparity spaces is another name for “state formation.” The ability to test brings effects into the world, not 
the least of which is what Timothy Mitchell has termed “state effects”: the effect of an always internal differentia-
tion between “state” and “society” (Mitchell, 1991). The state's ability to establish a “border crossing” by means of 
a test of identification is possible on the basis of the spreading of carry-on markers of identity (passports) across 
a population, so that an individual within that population, when attempting to cross the border, is always already 
commensurated in the sense that the comparative testing needed for identification can be carried out. This is why 
one strategy among those seeking to cross borders “irregularly” is to get rid of their passports. Without the re-
quired comparability, states have a hard time “processing” persons on the move. The absence of a passport tends 
therefore to result in longer periods of remaining in the hold of the state, during which other tests are performed 
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to establish people's identity and their deservingness to enter the country—this is what my second case will deal 
with. For now I would underscore that, because comparative testing “at the border” is what configures the identifi-
cation of citizens, it also configures their potentialities (go/no go), their capacities to circulate, or their restrictions, 
their “being on hold” and their being in the hold that “the border” constitutes for many today.
Citizenship testing thus begins “at the border,” with the very determination of being able to do so, or of having 
done so, legitimately. I focus here on the logic of identification but do so at the cost of abstracting what actually 
happens “at” the border, where persons and bodies are raced and gendered. It is crucial therefore to develop this 
analysis in line with a growing body of work on migration and intersectionality (cf. Amelina, 2017; Bastia, 2014; 
Bastia, Piper, & Carrón, 2011). The role of gender and sexuality in migration is part of my second case in this paper. 
For a next stop along the testing concours of citizenship ensues for many today who flee their country and at-
tempt to cross a border to build up a new existence in a foreign country by applying for asylum.
4  | SECOND STOP: TESTING DESERVINGNESS IN LGBT 
A SYLUM APPLIC ATIONS
For those who apply for asylum, the hold is a very concrete reality. In most, if not all, Western countries, the 
asylum applicant is interned, placed in a holding facility that is often called “asylum detention.” Ethnographic ac-
counts of asylum detention attest to the experience of lives “on hold,” in extended periods of passive waiting and 
boredom (Hertoghs, 2019). But here, too, the hold is a time and place of testing. And here as well, the outcome 
of the test is a decision: either a refugee is rejected (and then either denied the status of “refugee” or referred to 
another country for assessment), or a refugee is accepted and granted asylum. The test here revolves around the 
determination of the “deservingness” of asylum. To illustrate how this takes place, I draw on work done by Maja 
Hertoghs, who studied the Dutch asylum procedure up close in two asylum detention centers between 2014 and 
2016 by means of an extended ethnography of the Dutch Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND), involving 
observations of hearings of asylum applicants, interviews with IND officials and asylum lawyers, observations of 
meetings between IND officials and document analysis of hearing reports and asylum decisions (Hertoghs, 2019).
Deservingness has a variety of criteria (Bohmer & Shuman, 2008) that concern the establishment of a match 
between individual attributes and formal (legal and procedural) reasons for granting asylum. The Netherlands is 
one of several countries where a person's sexual identity can be reason for granting asylum, specifically in the case 
of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) identities. An asylum seeker ascribing to one such identity and 
claiming to be prosecuted or otherwise in danger because of it in their country of origin, may be eligible for asylum 
in the Netherlands. However, the IND needs to establish the veracity of both these claims: it needs to ascertain 
the plausibility of an LGBT identity, and it needs to ascertain the plausibility of this being dangerous for the asylum 
applicant. The latter might be the easiest part of “the procedure” (the emic name for the asylum procedure). Lists 
of countries where LGBT persons are in danger are used, so that, for instance, a gay man from Jamaica is almost 
certain to be granted asylum. The first, establishing sexual identity, is the tricky part. It is also the testing part of 
the procedure, since that which the state regards as a person's sexual identity—meaning here: the legitimate affor-
dances of that identity in terms of circulation and citizenship—is an outcome of the procedure. As the IND instructs 
its officers: “When an asylum seeker claims he is LGBT, it is up to the asylum seeker to substantiate that claimed 
homosexuality” (quoted in Hertoghs & Schinkel, 2018). From the commensuration of LGBT to “homosexuality” in 
just one sentence, one can surmise that much nuance disappears, and yet the IND is adamantly intent on finding 
the veracity of accounts of sexual identity.
In LGBT cases, the procedure thus becomes a test of one's sexual identity, and this means the asylum applicant 
is called upon to provide a true and authentic account of their sexual identity. And as Judith Butler has argued, 
such account-giving is inherently paradoxical, since it needs to appeal to social norms, from which the terms 
in which persons give an account of themselves are derived (Butler, 2005, p. 1). The singularity of the self can, 
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therefore, not be expressed other than by abstracting from that singularity, folding it into norms, expectations, 
and categories in a narrative account that undercuts the singular. We thus encounter a situation similar to the 
test of identification discussed in the first case: the singular or individuated can only emerge as the outcome of 
a test that abstracts from the singular and compares with the general, with categories and norms derived from 
populations, pluralities. And here, too, deceptibility is key in the sense that one's sexual identity cannot be taken 
at face value, nor can it be trusted as a mere declarative statement. What the IND seeks to establish is precisely 
the veracity—the plausibility for all practical purposes—of such statements. Deceptibility is very much present in 
the everyday workings of the procedure in the form of the suspicion that informs everything IND officers do. This 
suspicion is considered part of their raison d’être, as it is the only guarantee of justice in the face of the perceived 
need to separate the truly “deserving” from the “undeserving” asylum applicants. In the latter case, “state gen-
erosity” is considered abused, and so the establishment of the truth of one's sexual identity happens through a 
skeptical state epistemology.
But how do we go about this? How do we establish a person's sexual identity? Another paradox ensues, 
because this happens first of all by conceiving of that sexual identity as an innate, deep-seated personal core or 
infrastructure of selfhood (Hertoghs & Schinkel, 2018). Yet secondly, it happens by the demand of a credible per-
formance of that innate sexual essence. The test of deservingness in the case of LGBT asylum seekers comes down 
to this, to being able to perform a deep-seated identity. Of course this performance remains primarily discursive, 
though embodied comportment is part of it and it is reported on by IND officers working towards a decision on 
an asylum case. And part of the performance is the ascription to the essentialist conception of sexuality the IND 
deploys. This results in questions about, and detailed accounts of, moments of realization of one's sexual identity 
and, where applicable, coming out or getting caught or recognized as being what one is. In a remarkable inversion 
of the suspicion power tends to display, the IND’s default suspicion is that a person actually belong to the dom-
inant category of “heterosexuality.” The LGBT categories are the non-normal ones (which is perhaps why they 
can just as easily become commensurated to “homosexuality”), and to belong in one of them needs to be proven. 
Even though here, too, ambiguity remains and deceptibility governs the test, an account is to be crafted in such 
a way that veracity may be argued for in a procedural sense, informing a decision. Because everything hinges on 
the credibility of performance here, that performance is rehearsed. Lawyers and volunteers from the Refugee 
Council prep an applicant for the kinds of questions to expect at the hearings, and try to actively shape responses 
and comportment.
Applicants pass the test of deservingness when their accounts are “credible,” which means they contain 
enough details, are not frequently “vague” and are coherent overall as elements of an asylum case. While all these 
are subjective judgments, the IND goes through elaborate efforts to establish the “objectivity” of the decision. 
This happens through working with different IND officers at different hearings, by having a decision made by 
officers not present at these hearings, and by allowing for a preliminary decision (“voornemen”) to be challenged 
by the applicant's lawyer, after which yet another IND officer weighs the evidence. At stake in the test is often 
an embodied understanding of the meaning of “homosexuality” that conforms to the IND’s highly heterosexual 
understanding of this. Most enlightening in this respect is a case where asylum was refused and the arguments for 
this were given in the written decision:
If the applicant were truly homosexual, he would have been able to credibly speak from his inner feelings 
and observations about what homosexuality contains, certainly now, after he has been in Europe for 
many years. (quoted in Hertoghs & Schinkel, 2018)
What becomes apparent here is that the test of one's sexual identity (which is at the same time the test of one's 
deservingness of—partial—citizenship) centers on a conception of sexuality as inner core and infrastructure of person-
hood. Sexuality is like a mold into which a person's life unfolds. Because this inner core impresses itself on so much 
of life, both inner and outer, it is a deep structure that nonetheless has surface traceability. So if an account of (in this 
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case) a homosexual identity does not conform to the very conception of sexuality the IND adopts, it may conclude 
that the identity if feigned. If it were a deep infrastructure of selfhood, it would surface and be coherently traceable. 
In the case mentioned here, the IND explicates:
His statements involving what homosexuality contains are least of all convincing. In that context he 
states … that homosexuality means that a man sleeps with a man. Homosexuals do everything that a man 
normally puts into a woman into a man, they kiss everywhere, and dress up like women. … It is obvious 
that the applicant presents a very flat and stereotyped image of what homosexuality contains. An image 
that might be expected of people that mock people with a homosexual nature or who are ignorant of what 
homosexuality truly is. It is not credible that the applicant, if he really was homosexual, would present 
such a superficial and shallow image of what homosexuality is. (quoted in Hertoghs & Schinkel, 2018).
What is striking here is that the IND, which itself espouses a markedly binary, heteronormative and hence stereotyp-
ical conception of what it calls “homosexuality,” demands of gay applicants a shared non-stereotypical view of homo-
sexuality. The performance of homosexuality here emerges as the presentation of the right image of homosexuality, 
which, while binary and heteronormative, must be judged to be too stereotypical for it to pass off as evidence of ho-
mosexuality. In this case, that also means the IND officer states that the absence of romantic feelings by the applicant 
for his sexual partner are considered non-credible.
For an LGBT asylum applicant, then, the hold presents itself as a prolonged test in which an image of sexual 
identity gradually surfaces in written reports of hearings, in a preliminary decision and in a final decision of deserv-
ingness or undeservingness. This test is riddled with ambiguity, and ultimately it is clear for all participants that the 
facts cannot decide the issue, just as they cannot do so in scientific tests (cf. Latour, 1987). As in science, the “facts” 
are the outcome of testing and deliberating among the testers. But unlike in science, what allows the facts to emerge, 
at least for all practical purposes, is a delegated form of sovereign power that crystallizes, very classically, in what 
is throughout the procedure called “the decision.” That decision needs to be well founded, and that is why the test 
exists, and why suspicion—the desire to avoid error—persists throughout the test. But as is the case with all decisions, 
the decision is ultimately unfounded, and needs to cling to procedural correctness—proper testing conduct—in order 
to uphold itself in the face of ambiguity and ultimate arbitrariness. This is the case for all asylum requests, not just 
those based on sexual identity. Any claim to asylum is met with suspicion and refugeeness—and hence deservingness 
of asylum status—is met with suspicion and put to the test. As in the case of identification at the border, then, the 
state emerges in, or better yet as, a testing capacity that configures questions of sovereignty prompted by the circu-
lation of bodies as questions of knowledge of the other. And in both cases, ambiguity is not something the state seeks 
to eradicate. Rather, ambiguity is what allows the state to manifest itself in the first place. As Rogier van Reekum says, 
if the state were to really eradicate doubt, “it would progressively rid itself of investigative capacities … Government 
would truly become administration” (van Reekum, 2018, p. 3). Or in other words, the enactment of borders, in these 
cases, at the same time demonstrates the specific kind of association that makes claims to statehood—that demon-
stration is the effect of state work, but that is a work which can get to be credibly called “state” only after the effect.
5  | THIRD STOP: A SSESSING “ IMMIGR ANT INTEGR ATION”
My last case pertains to what is called, throughout Western Europe, “immigrant integration.” It pertains to those 
who crossed the border, who have rights, even to many who never migrated, but who are nonetheless observed 
as different, as not merely “in need of” something called “immigrant integration,” but as simply tested for it, ob-
served in terms of “immigrant integration.” Generally, “immigrant integration” is seen in terms of “adjustment to 
society.” What immediately becomes clear, then, is that immigrants, as well as their children, tend to be regarded 
as somehow external to the domain of “society” (Schinkel, 2017). Indeed, this is why it is common, for instance in 
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the Netherlands, to speak of immigrants as residing “outside society” or, as in Germany, as making up a “parallel 
society” (Parallelgesellschaft). Of course they are neither in France or Belgium, and if they were, they would not be 
objects of problematization and integration testing in the Netherlands or Germany (Boersma & Schinkel, 2018). So 
the fact that they are, somehow, “here” (in the Netherlands) is constitutive of the assumption that they are really 
not quite here (in “society”). This is why there is regular (longitudinal) state-sponsored and state-organized inte-
gration monitoring, and it is also why this monitoring is a form of testing. Immigrants and their children are “here”—
yet what integration monitoring seeks to assess is whether they are really here or whether they are, in fact, still 
in the process of “arriving” (Boersma, 2019; Boersma & Schinkel, 2018). Immigrant integration monitoring closely 
mirrors the concerns of state policies (Favell, 2003), and this is not very surprising given the fact that often states 
are the explicit clients, sponsors, and even conductors of the work that integration monitoring constitutes. It re-
lies, moreover, on surveys, population registries, and employment data that are frequently state-owned and state-
run. In the Netherlands, the Institute for Social Research (SCP) and the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) are the 
main institutions (both are state institutions) who conduct longitudinal integration monitoring surveys and studies, 
and my analysis here rests on a discourse analysis of work done by these institutions. This analysis proceeds with a 
Foucaultian emphasis on the production of objects of problematization, and on the stabilization of encompassing 
onto-epistemic conceptions of “modernity” and “society,” to the point where such conceptions are naturalized to 
such an extent that they are unavoidable presuppositions of talk and action precisely under conditions of ongoing 
endangerment of their naturalcy and stability. The resulting state work can thus be seen as a contemporary modi-
fication of the state-enacted racism Foucault analyzes in “Il faut defendre la société” (Foucault, 1997).
Integration monitoring occurs in a variety of ways, centering mostly on “socio-economic integration” and 
“socio-cultural integration.” For brevity's sake, I shall focus on two forms of the latter kind here. The first pertains 
to the degree of “modernity” that subjects of integration monitoring are tested to display. This happens in various 
ways, one of which is to consider their “secularity,” which is defined (reductively) as being non-religious and/or 
being non-churchgoing, even though “church” here mostly stands in for “mosque,” and those who might go to 
church are often not subjects of integration monitoring. The Netherlands is then defined as “secular,” and the 
fact that about a million people identify as Muslims is not taken as an indication that the country has changed in 
terms of its religiosity. Rather, the conclusion of this type of measurement is that a million people are at a greater 
or lesser remove from “Dutch society.” The test that integration monitoring constitutes, operates as a kind of 
shibboleth here: if a certain feature is present, then one cannot “pass” as an unproblematic “member of society.” 
The conclusion is that migrants that are more “religious” than “society” is assumed to be (though the latter is not 
measured in the same monitoring practices) are less “modern,” and hence show a “lag,” as the modernization 
literature of the 1950s and 1960s often concluded (cf. Lerner, 1958). In a similar way, anthropologist Johannes 
Fabian (2014) has argued that anthropology has long assumed that difference constituted a temporal lag. Here, 
the spatial metaphor of “distance from society” is at once coded as temporal lag (as not being with the program of 
modernity). Such versions of “difference” are the outcome of tests of difference that ratify themselves because 
they are conducted solely among those who are considered to “differ.”
Something similar occurs in the measurement of “contacts with members of other ethnic groups,” which is a 
second way of establishing “socio-cultural integration.” Here, people get lumped into “ethnic groups” by means of 
pure ascription, and these are compared with “autochthonous Dutch” in terms of the number of contacts members 
of these groups have with members of other groups. Though officially rescinded by several government research 
bodies in 2016, the chthonic language of “autochthonous” (literally: from this soil) and “allochthonous” (from other 
soil) has been pervasive in the Netherlands from at least 1989 (when the Scientific Council for Government Policy 
started using it) until the present (cf. Geschiere, 2009). The fact that many if not most “allochthones” were and are 
born on Dutch soil indicates the way these concepts always already operated as strategic markers of problemati-
zation. In the analysis of “contacts,” it turns out that “autochthonous Dutch” have the least contacts with members 
of other groups, that is, white Dutch citizens, relatively speaking, keep to themselves. But this is not considered 
a test of their socio-cultural integration or a demonstration of their lack thereof. Rather, what happens is that the 
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tables are turned, quite literally when tables with numbers of contacts are considered: when reporting results, it 
appears that “contacts with members of other ethnic groups” in fact means “contacts with autochthonous Dutch.” 
Somehow, those with the least inter-ethnic contacts are promoted to the rank of unproblematic members of 
society, the benchmark for others whose contacts with those autochthonous Dutch constitute the test of their 
“integration.” Of course, it is difficult for members of a variety of ethnic groups to be in contact with autochtho-
nous Dutch, if the latter have little contact with members of other ethnic groups: this is the same phenomenon. So 
between the introduction of this measurement of socio-cultural integration and the presentation of its results, this 
measurement has turned into a test of the degree to which non-autochthonous Dutch approach autochthonous 
Dutch, who have become the benchmark for “society.” But this test, which assumes and measures assimilation, can 
only find difference. This is a difference in degrees. One can be more or less different, more or less well integrated, 
but there will, due to the definition of groups and the elevation of one of them to neutral reference category, of 
necessity be difference.
Testing here, as often, pertains to an evaluative assessment of how well specific subjects are doing on selected 
variables. But the evaluation requires a comparative aspect, a benchmark. A comparity space is silently assumed 
here, and it is called “society” and consists of “autochthonous Dutch” citizens. For non-autochthonous Dutch, to 
be a citizen is to approach, as much as possible, a benchmark one cannot possible ever achieve. In other words, the 
entire setup of integration testing tacitly assumes, from the outset, an image of “society.” This is never defined, 
though it figures when “secularity” becomes the benchmark for a test of religiosity as a marker for a degree of 
“integration.” And it figures, in the sense of emerging from the background in a figure/ground reversal, when “con-
tacts with autochthonous Dutch” become coded as the norm for being “integrated” (albeit not for autochthonous 
Dutch themselves).
Testing can be considered in terms of revealing the unknown qualities of a certain object. At the same time, 
throughout the history of testing (most significantly psychological and educational testing, but also in much 
scientific experimentation), the quality involved in the test was considered known in advance. Testing was, in 
such cases, configured on the basis of its being sensitive to this, but the quantity or degree to which this quality 
(property, capacity) existed was the unknown and the hoped-for outcome of the test. In this case, the “quality” 
amounts to a statement of difference, and testing pertains to the quantity of difference, the degree of “distance 
from society,” the “degree of integration.” Of necessity, difference, or a “lag,” is the outcome of testing, because 
testing occurs on the basis of a comparison to a reference category over against which comparative categories are 
a priori defined as different. In other words, the test produces a “lag,” and necessarily so, as it “benchmarks” on a 
category to which the tested subjects or categories are a priori defined as different. In fact, their prior calibration 
as different is the very reason for being tested. Testing is thus a highly tautological affair here. It has all the char-
acteristics of a rhetorical device that enables the state to problematize immigrant groups with good reason, since 
tests governed by “objectivity” show difference.
And so, in a way, one could say that the “real” test resides in whether one is tested at all. Those who are tested 
will a priori be assessed as beyond the realm of “society” proper, however “well integrated” they are. Those who 
aren't tested for their individual or group-level “difference” receive what I have elsewhere called a “dispensation 
of integration” (Schinkel, 2017).
So while immigrant integration is “measured,” it is indeed more accurate to say that it constitutes a test of the 
degree of difference of those measured. The real conceit here would be to believe that, given existing conceptions 
of immigrant integration, something might be learned that wasn't always already internal to the monitoring system 
itself. Similarly, Niklas Luhmann has argued that the surprise that may follow a scientific test does not present a 
“realist” argument against the self-referentiality of scientific knowledge:
The system can gain confirmation by what it already knows: that it operates in an environment … It 
thereby learns nothing about that environment—except for the fact that it affirms or negates the system’s 
expectations. The system only ever tests its own expectations. (Luhmann, 1990, p. 261)
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In the case of immigrant integration monitoring, at least, such appears the case, since a “self-projected meaning” 
underlies the test of immigrant integration from the beginning: “integration” is always already conceptualized as that 
which supposedly (though this isn't tested) characterizes the ideal of whiteness, of native Dutch with jobs, a nonreli-
gious life characterized by tolerance but also by the exclusivity of their social contacts among themselves.
If integration testing is considered as one enactment of public life through state work, it becomes apparent 
that the state here attains a strongly moral character. Integration monitoring is a moral monitoring (Schinkel, 
2017), and it has the effect of a moral purification of the imaginary domain of “society.” For it appears that, as 
soon as problems appear, they concern people not fully “integrated in society.” That “society” itself, then, has no 
problems. If crime is an issue, it is not “society's” issue, but that of individuals external to it, at a remove from it, 
who are unintegrated and reside “outside society,” even though prisons are generally regarded as “in” society and 
a vital part of it even. Likewise, “socio-economic integration” entails the assumption that those at the bottom of 
what is a socio-economic hierarchy are really external to the hierarchy. Poverty is not a problem “in society,” but a 
problem of individuals “outside society,” and they are outside society for the very reason that they are poor, hence 
insufficiently “integrated.” “Integration” thus becomes applicable in all cases that deviate from prevailing norms, 
and it thereby becomes a way of morally cleansing the imaginary of “society.” Considering that integration moni-
toring is a form of state work, it is then important to recognize the moral work that the state performs in order to 
enact the very imaginary of society.
Testing here configures differentiation vis-à-vis a “normal” benchmark, but that means it is relational and nec-
essarily also pertains to the configuration of the benchmark. That is to say that the quality or capacity tested for, 
and the characteristics of the tester and the infrastructure of testing are not stable objects that precede the test 
but derive the plausibility of their assumed stability from the test. What “society” is becomes communicable only 
by way of displaying difference. This requires the a priori inclusion of “society” as a testing benchmark, but that 
is not how society becomes publicly available as a reference object. Even though the test always and of necessity 
required a tacit inclusion of “society,” the public availability of this social imaginary emerges as effect of the test. 
In order for that to happen, there has to be a hold. People are imagined as in the hold of their tradition, of religion, 
of their ethnic minority, their neighborhood, their culture, or their sending country. In short, they are in the hold of 
their “background,” which starkly contrasts with the “neutrality” and whiteness of “society.” But that imagination 
itself means that those people, when they are tested for their integration and demonstrated to be in the hold of 
their “background,” remain in the hold of the very act of coding and imagining. And it means they are in the hold 
of the state conducting ostensibly epistemic tests upon them.
And this hold can persist into the future along the long lines of migratory affect. There are what one can call 
“nth generation immigrants” (Schinkel, 2017): those who never actually migrated but descend from “migrants” (but 
only post-World War II migrants, not the politically neutralized hominid dispersal of the predecessors of “native 
citizens”). These continue to produce progeny that constitute a potential testing reservoir, since culture and tra-
dition can be tenacious, and assimilation can take generations. Testing for “immigrant integration,” then, allows 
what postcolonial literary scholars call “arrival narratives” to be extended (Boersma & Schinkel, 2018; Quayson & 
Daswani, 2013). Even at this third stop of the citizenship concours, when immigrants are “settling,” they are again 
stirred into motion in a work of imagination for which testing provides the evidence. Those who migrated, and 
their children, are still, and potentially perpetually, arriving. State officials measuring integration here show their 
Derridean feathers: différer (to differ) also means déférer (to defer to, to postpone). In this sense, a hold persists 
for subjects of “immigrant integration.” They resemble the man waiting before the law in Kafka's parable Vor dem 
Gezetz, who forever remains outside to be tested, in a trial before even getting to the law, only to find out that the 
real test consisted in being tested or not. Perhaps the best strategy for citizenship when confronted with immi-
grant integration surveys would be what Kafka (1996, p. 380) writes in another one of his short stories, Die Prüfung 
(“The Test”): “He who does not answer the questions has passed the test.”
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6  | CONCLUSION: ON TESTING
By discussing these cases, this paper seeks to primarily contribute to work on the entanglement between the 
state and migration. A secondary contribution it makes is to understandings of testing in political settings. In this 
concluding section, I in particular draw out some points regarding the relationship between the state and testing.
Seeing citizenship testing as state work means considering it as “state labor under capitalist conditions” where, 
as Stefano Harney has said, “state work is the term for that kind of labor that most knows itself as comparison, 
equivalency, and exchange in the social realm” (Harney, 2002, pp. 10–11). Throughout the testing practices dis-
cussed here, comparison, equivalency, and exchange figure prominently. Testing thus involves comparity work, 
the work of crafting a tertium comparationis, a shared space of comparison (Schinkel, 2016). This means that the 
tests are always already inscribed in a calibrated conception of, in this case, a national norm. Especially in the last 
two cases it becomes very apparent that testing occurs within an overall orientation toward norms of heteronor-
mativity, nativity, and whiteness.
This “always already” is possible because the practices described here are forms of state work. Testing, like ex-
perimentation, involves attention and experience. It's a very pragmatic thing, and if state work amounts to testing 
in the cases discussed, that means “the state” gets to be seen in a pragmatist conception as a practical achieve-
ment. But even here, something of what Cassirer (1946) called the “myth” of the state remains. In their history of 
wonders, Daston and Park argue that natural wonders, secrets and experiments are all phenomena of experience, 
and all were “proven recipes for medical and magical preparations, [which] often drew on the occult properties of 
natural substances, and they were excluded from natural philosophy for the same reasons” (Daston & Park, 1998, 
p. 129; cf. Hadot, 2004, pp. 165–166). And upon closer scrutiny, the practices that constitute “migration” as a 
testing concours all have their “occult properties.” They are strikingly characterized by imaginaries of "objectivity,” 
and they appear as knowledge practices. But all the while, they are also ways of proceduralizing what necessarily 
escapes: they identify in the face of deception and ambiguity, they establish sexual identity as if it were a deep-
seated infrastructure of being, and they mobilize a mythic “society” in its absence by rendering difference avail-
able for attention and further problematization. The kinds of state work discussed here keep a variety of factishes 
afloat, such as a “society” with “members,” people that “are” (or are not) “modern.” And these factishes, in turn, are 
assumed as the epistemic foothold for tests of the veracity of identity and citizenship of those enmeshed in the 
thing called “migration.” They become, in other words, ways of processing variety.
Testing is an adequate practice for processing variety, because it involves differentiation. The necessity of 
differentiation is the working assumption of all testing; entities with necessarily homogeneous qualities and quan-
tities need not be tested, they can be classified. Because testing involves differentiation it is a practice that figures 
in the workings of what Deleuze and Guattari (2004) call the “binary machines” that produce the lines of “hard 
segmentarity” that run through social life: gender, sex, race, class, citizenship, and so on. And these are not mere 
classifications. As this paper has sought to illustrate, a variety of epistemic practices exist to construe such seg-
mentary lines as “outcomes” of tests. And because these tests are conducted in and through state work, their out-
comes are not evenly challengeable. They depend on decisions, that is, on the authority to, as Marylin Strathern 
has said, “cut the network” (Strathern, 1996). Considering citizenship as a testing concours means to thus situate 
and relocate what is generally called “state authority.”
Key to the relationship between the state and citizenship testing is that the configuration of tests entails the 
co-configuration of the tester. This also means that tests need not be, as Hanson (1993, pp. 18–19) holds, “repre-
sentational techniques” in which the information collected is not the goal but a representation of it (as an IQ test, 
for instance, tests not the ability to answer questions but a more general thing named “intelligence”). Yet con-
sidering citizenship as testing concours illustrates how “migration” and “citizenship” are enacted through a state 
work that co-configures a social “inside” that is presumed as the pre-existing ground of the test, whether it goes 
by the name of “nation” or of “society.” This is because the citizenship testing has public effects: they both render 
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citizenship and migration available as objects of concern to publics, and they render certain publics available to 
observation by themselves and others.
One potential limitation of a focus on testing is that one tends to consider setups and practices as consciously 
designed tests. Thereby, a cognitivist bias is smuggled into the analysis of testing practices. And then “testing” 
threatens to become a form of deliberation by other means—something that is especially consequential when 
testing and experimentation are proffered as alternatives (one might say functional equivalents) of liberal, delib-
erative models of politics. This may be due to the legacy of STS and science studies, and their transposition of the 
vocabulary and practice of the laboratory (cf. Latour, 1988). In science, tests, experiments, demonstrations, and 
pilots yield surprise (i.e., information), repetition (redundancy), and ambiguity, but they only ever do so in setups 
controlled and consciously planned as tests. But the productivity of concepts like test, demonstration, and exper-
iment might be maximized if using them can yield fresh perspectives on phenomena not consciously shaped as 
tests, demonstrations, or experiments, phenomena that are neither evidence of a “test drive” or part of a rhetoric 
of testing (Ronell, 2005). A final contribution this paper seeks to make to work on testing lies, then, in considering 
practices as tests that are not necessarily imagined as such by those involved in them. Paying attention to citizen-
ship and migration in terms of testing reveals that testing involves boundary work, normative benchmarks, and 
factishes that all concern the configuration of the “test”—in this case: the state and the idealized fiction of the 
“native citizen” it deploys but cannot substantiate (and thus govern) without testing others.
This also draws attention to an ethics of testing. The state work through which citizenship is configured as a 
testing concours draws people into policing relations to specific bodies exhibiting specific kinds of mobilities. To 
presume to be able to test, to assume the power to demonstrate, may be disguised in the objectivity of a modest 
witness, but it enacts sovereign power and configures the relational as a series of asymmetric capacities to ex-
tract exposition effects from bodies. In the cases described here, these asymmetric capacities and the normative 
benchmarking this comes with, shape a particular ethics of testing in which relationality gets done in asymmetric, 
suspicious, decisionist ways. Yet, as we know, there are other modalities of relationality. To shape relationality 
as being-in-common, another meaning of “testing” might be more pertinent: testing as displacing or suspending 
boundaries, as the open and demonstrative commoning of a form-of-life that does not pretend to already know 
how to live together.
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